Federal law currently makes it illegal to fire you, deny you a home, or turn you away from an emergency room because of your sex. Within days, the Supreme Court will decide whether that protection still applies to transgender Americans.
Updates
It is rare for the Court to release opinions on a Tuesday, and the announcement that Thursday will close the term means the final rulings are imminent. The decisions in B.P.J. and Hecox will come down on one of these two days.
The June calendar had the next two Thursdays marked as conference days, when the justices meet privately to discuss and vote on pending cases. This afternoon the Court designated June 18 as an opinion day as well. Late in the term, opinion days get added as the backlog clears, and an added day means more decisions are imminent. It does not say which ones. B.P.J. and Hecox remain undecided, and they could come down on any opinion day.
When the Supreme Court decides West Virginia v. B.P.J. and Little v. Hecox, the coverage will write itself. Two cases about trans athletes. Two rulings on who gets to run on a girls' track team. The story packages itself. Fairness, competition, the politics of the playing field.
That is the story the conservative movement wants told.
The architects of these cases did not choose sports by accident. Sports is the issue where "fairness" can be invoked without anyone naming what is actually being targeted beyond this issue in the same ruling: almost every fundamental civil right for millions of trans Americans, simultaneously.
What the Court is actually deciding is the scope of a single word. "Sex" appears, undefined, in Title VII, Title IX, the Fair Housing Act, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
One word, and those five statutes, supports nearly the entire legal architecture of protection for trans Americans at a federal level. And many state and local laws rely on it for their basis, too.
Far-right conservatives in state legislatures across America have been furiously rewriting the law to enable open discrimination against trans Americans.
So has the Supreme Court.
In 2025, United States v. Skrmetti upheld state bans on gender-affirming care for minors. The majority ruled the laws classify by "age and medical use," not sex, and so deserve only the most deferential judicial review. In 2026, Chiles v. Salazar turned the First Amendment against conversion-therapy bans.
Running beneath both, the conservative majority has been hollowing out Bostock v. Clayton County. That 2020 decision held you cannot be fired simply for being transgender. The Court has never overruled it. Instead, it is choosing to chip away at it, and narrow the precedent so much that it will protect almost no one in practice.
The Court can say it never touched the precedent, while the impact is that the precedent protects no one.
But a broad ruling in B.P.J. and Hecox would be the most serious step in this assault yet.
If the Court holds that "sex" means biological sex for purposes of federal education law, this will cast shockwaves across the entire civil rights landscape. Employment. Housing. Healthcare. Public accommodations. Wherever the same undefined word does the same legal work.
And it will trip wires already laid in statutes by state legislatures. For one example of this, look to West Virginia's bathroom ban: it's written to activate the moment the ruling protecting trans students in the Fourth Circuit falls. The trigger is literally in the text. The mechanism is already wired, waiting for the ruling, just like abortion bans kicking in after the fall of Roe v. Wade.
Both cases reach that question through sports.
Lindsay Hecox, a trans woman and student at Boise State, challenged Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" after it excluded her from the women's track team.
Little v. Hecox asks whether federal education law and the Constitution's equal protection guarantee permit a state to bar students from teams on the basis of sex assigned at birth.
The Court heard them together on January 13, 2026. Three and a half hours of argument in a single combined session.
The civil rights of trans Americans were discussed for less than half a day before the Court had heard enough to push forward.
In those three and a half hours, the justices showed where this is heading. The Court appeared ready to side with the states and uphold the bans. The real question is how far the opinion reaches.
The Court appeared likely to rule in favor of the states, upholding the bans. But the critical question is how broadly they'll write the decision:
Justice Gorsuch was the most sympathetic to the challengers among the conservatives. He asked whether transgender individuals should be treated as a "discrete and insular class" given the history of discrimination against them. Gorsuch wrote the Bostock opinion in 2020 and was cautious here about extending it.
Justices Alito and Thomas gave little away at argument — Thomas, as is his habit, asked nothing. Both dissented from Bostock in 2020 and joined the Skrmetti majority in 2025, and are expected to vote to uphold the bans.
Narrow ruling: The Court says Title IX allows sex-separated sports teams based on biology. The broader constitutional question gets punted. Bostock survives untouched in the employment context. This is the least harmful outcome but still gives states a green light for sports bans specifically.
Broad ruling: "Sex" in federal law means biological sex at birth, everywhere. The Equal Protection Clause doesn't protect against transgender-status discrimination in any context involving sex classifications. Every lower court ruling protecting transgender people under Title IX gets reversed. Bostock is confined to the narrow context of hiring and firing.
Most likely outcome: Something between the two, but skewing broad. Roberts' "across the board" comment and Barrett's interest in the scrutiny framework suggest the opinion will reach beyond sports, even if it doesn't say so explicitly. That is a read of the argument rather than a guarantee, and the Court has surprised people before.
And a fourth possibility: no merits ruling in Hecox at all. Lindsay Hecox has told the courts she no longer intends to compete, and the question of whether her case is moot was argued alongside the merits. The Court could dismiss Hecox and rule only in B.P.J., or resolve both narrowly on procedural grounds. A punt would change the timeline rather than the trajectory: the same question would return next term, to the same Court.
The Court says Title IX allows sex-separated sports teams based on biology. The broader constitutional question gets punted. Bostock survives untouched in the employment context.
Something between the two, but skewing broad. Roberts’ “across the board” comment and Barrett’s interest in the scrutiny framework suggest the opinion will reach beyond sports.
“Sex” in federal law means biological sex at birth, everywhere. Every lower court ruling protecting transgender people under Title IX gets reversed. Bostock is confined to hiring and firing.
A fourth path: the Court could dismiss Hecox as moot and rule only in B.P.J. - a punt that changes the timeline, not the trajectory.
If the Court rules broadly in B.P.J. and Hecox, defining "sex" in federal law as biological sex at birth, the consequences fall into three tiers: changes the ruling itself triggers, changes it accelerates, and changes that were never waiting on the Court at all. Keeping those tiers separate matters, because blurring them overstates what the Court controls and understates what is already law.
West Virginia's bathroom ban is built to activate. The state's "Riley Gaines Act" (SB 456) has a literal tripwire provision: it cannot be enforced while the 4th Circuit's Grimm ruling stands, and it repeals its own enforcement limit the moment Grimm is overruled or rendered ineffective. A broad ruling pulls that trigger, and trans West Virginians can be barred from restrooms, locker rooms, and domestic violence shelters in state-owned buildings. Whether a narrower sports-only ruling pulls it too will be fought over in court, since Grimm rests on both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. West Virginia will argue it has.
Court orders protecting trans athletes in five states fall away. The injunctions in Idaho, West Virginia, Arizona, Utah, and New Hampshire mostly protect named plaintiffs. In several of those states the bans already apply to everyone else. A broad ruling clears the way for courts to dissolve those orders on remand: a process of days to months, not an automatic switch.
The three circuit court rulings that currently protect transgender students are dead. Grimm, Whitaker, and Hecox fall, and with them the federal precedent for challenging bathroom and sports exclusions. See the detailed breakdown below.
Every state with a trans sports ban (27 by statute) faces no remaining federal constitutional obstacle. State constitutional challenges survive (they have already won in Montana and Kansas), but the federal track closes.
School districts change policies without waiting for new laws. A broad ruling gives them legal cover to exclude trans students immediately: bathroom access, pronoun policies, locker room assignments, dormitory assignments.
Employers revise HR policies. Bostock technically still protects against being fired for being trans. The EEOC's new federal-sector position already says bathroom and facility access is not covered, and a broad ruling invites courts to confirm that nationwide.
Insurers and employer health plans gain cover to drop gender-affirming care. No federal law requires coverage, and a broad ruling removes the constitutional argument. State coverage mandates still apply on their own terms where they exist.
Federal legislation gains a tailwind. H.R. 28 (national sports ban) already passed the House. H.R. 8781 (rewriting Title IX to say "biological sex") sits in committee with 33 cosponsors.
The adult-care fight expands. Oklahoma's SB 904, already law, cuts off public funds for gender transition care. Kentucky is advancing a bill to expand its Medicaid exclusion to adults. We expect the first attempt at an outright adult care ban to follow under the ruling's cover.
Crowther v. Board of Regents (next term) tests how far the rollback goes. The question presented is whether school employees can sue under Title IX at all. If the Court narrows Title IX's enforcement there too, the damage reaches anyone filing a sex discrimination claim in education, not only trans people.
The legislative wave was never waiting for permission. Legislatures introduced 793 anti-trans bills in 2026 and passed 55 of them before any ruling, and roughly 363 anti-trans laws have passed since 2021. Most statehouses have already adjourned for the year, so the ruling's legislative payoff arrives in special sessions and the 2027 calendars, not "within weeks."
The executive branch already moved too. The EEOC reversals, the Title IX rule vacatur, the passport and federal ID restrictions, and the VA and federal-employee coverage rollbacks are all done or in motion, with or without the Court. What a broad ruling adds is permanence: it makes those moves nearly impossible to unwind.
Bostock doesn't get formally overruled. It just gets read so narrowly that it only protects you if you're literally fired for being trans and nothing else. Your employer can ban you from the bathroom, refuse your pronouns, exclude you from health insurance, and create a hostile environment, and as long as they don't fire you, Bostock doesn't help. The Supreme Court can say it never overturned precedent while the precedent protects almost no one.
Three federal appeals court rulings currently stand between transgender students and total exclusion from federal protection. A broad ruling in B.P.J. overrules all three.
What happened: Gavin Grimm, a transgender boy, was barred from using the boys' restroom at his Virginia high school. The school board passed a policy requiring students to use facilities matching their "biological gender."
What the court ruled: The 4th Circuit held that both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause protect transgender students' right to use restrooms matching their gender identity. The court applied intermediate scrutiny (the standard for sex-based classifications) and found that the school board's policy discriminated against Grimm because of his sex. The reasoning: you cannot classify Grimm as a girl without reference to his sex assigned at birth, and that's sex discrimination.
Why it matters: Grimm is the legal foundation for bathroom access for transgender students in the 4th Circuit (Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina). It is also the precedent that West Virginia's SB 456 is specifically written around: the trigger provision says the bathroom ban cannot be enforced while Grimm stands. If Grimm falls, the bathroom ban activates.
What dies with it: Every transgender student in the 4th Circuit loses bathroom access protection. Every school district that changed its bathroom policy because of Grimm can reverse course. The federal legal basis for challenging bathroom bans collapses, leaving only state constitutions and explicit state statutes standing.
What happened: Ashton Whitaker, a transgender boy, was told he could not use the boys' restroom at his Wisconsin high school and was required to use a separate single-staff restroom. He was also told he could not stay overnight with male classmates on a school trip.
What the court ruled: The 7th Circuit held that the school's policy likely violated both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and found that the policy was based on sex stereotyping: the school was treating Whitaker differently because his gender identity didn't match his sex assigned at birth. The court also rejected the school's argument that it had a privacy justification, finding the policy was not substantially related to protecting other students' privacy.
Why it matters: Whitaker was the first federal appeals court ruling to hold that Title IX protects transgender students from bathroom exclusion. It established the framework that other circuits followed. The 7th Circuit reaffirmed this reasoning in A.C. v. Metropolitan School District of Martinsville (2023), where three transgender boys won access to the boys' restrooms.
What dies with it: Transgender students in the 7th Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin) lose bathroom and overnight accommodation protections. More importantly, the reasoning that "sex discrimination includes gender identity discrimination" (the same logic Bostock used) is rejected in the education context. Courts across the country that relied on Whitaker's framework to protect trans students will reverse course.
What happened: Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and Boise State student, challenged Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" (HB 500), which categorically bans transgender women from women's sports teams at any Idaho public school or university. A separate plaintiff, a cisgender girl who doesn't conform to sex stereotypes, also challenged the law.
What the court ruled: The 9th Circuit held that Idaho's ban "certainly classifies on the basis of sex" and "also classifies based on transgender status, triggering heightened scrutiny on both grounds." The court found the ban was not substantially related to an important governmental interest because it was overbroad: it excluded transgender women regardless of their physiology, medical treatment, or the nature of the sport. The court upheld a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the ban.
Why it matters: This is the case now before SCOTUS as Little v. Hecox. The 9th Circuit's ruling is the strongest federal appeals court decision on transgender rights: it held that sports bans are sex-based classifications that fail intermediate scrutiny. If the Supreme Court reverses it, the reasoning applies far beyond sports: any law that classifies based on transgender status can be framed as a "medical use" or "age" classification (the Skrmetti playbook) and survive rational basis review.
What dies with it: The strongest circuit court precedent for transgender constitutional protection is gone. The 9th Circuit's holding that transgender status triggers heightened scrutiny (the highest bar any circuit court has set) is reversed. Every other court in the country takes the signal: sex-based classifications that affect transgender people get rational basis review, the most deferential standard, under which laws almost never fail.
Taken together, these three rulings established the principle that the word "sex" in federal civil rights law includes gender identity. They held that transgender students can use restrooms matching their gender identity (Grimm, Whitaker), that they can take part in school activities consistent with their gender identity (Hecox), and that laws targeting transgender people are sex-based classifications courts must examine closely (Grimm, Whitaker, Hecox).
If all three fall, the opposite principle replaces them. "Sex" means biological sex at birth in every federal statute. Laws targeting transgender people get the lowest level of judicial review, and no federal court is required to protect them from exclusion in any context. A ruling that reaches that far is a civil rights rollback, whatever the headline calls it.
Set the sports frame aside and the question underneath is the one this report opened with: does the word "sex" in federal civil rights law mean biological sex assigned at birth, or does it include gender identity?
If the Court defines "sex" as biological, the effects cascade across the entire body of federal anti-discrimination law. Five domains, before and after.
Before the ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) that firing someone for being transgender violates Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. That precedent still technically stands, and it is being eroded from every direction. A federal judge in Texas ruled that Bostock applies only to hiring and firing decisions, not to workplace policies on bathrooms, pronouns, or dress codes. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Trump administration has reversed its prior position and ruled that federal agencies can exclude transgender employees from using facilities matching their gender identity. And the agency has moved to dismiss discrimination lawsuits it had filed on behalf of transgender workers.
After a broad ruling
Lower courts use the new definition of "sex" to narrow Bostock further. If "sex" means biology for Title IX, courts will ask why it means something different for Title VII, since both statutes use the same word. Expect challenges to transgender people's protections in hiring, firing, harassment claims, health insurance coverage, and workplace accommodation.
Bostock doesn’t get formally overruled. It just gets read so narrowly that it only protects you if you’re literally fired for being trans and nothing else.
Before the ruling
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in education. Three federal appeals court rulings read it to protect transgender students: Grimm v. Gloucester County, which held that a transgender boy must be allowed to use the boys' bathroom, the 7th Circuit's line of cases protecting transgender students, and the 9th Circuit's ruling in Hecox itself. The Biden-era Title IX rule interpreting "sex" to cover gender identity is already dead, vacated nationwide in January 2025.
After a broad ruling
All three circuit protections are overruled, and schools can ban transgender students from bathrooms, locker rooms, dormitories, and sports, with constitutional backing. The vacated rule becomes legally impossible to reinstate. A separate case, Crowther v. Board of Regents (No. 25-183), accepted for next term, could further limit Title IX as an enforcement tool.
Before the ruling
After a broad ruling
Courts apply the biological definition to the Fair Housing Act too. Transgender people lose federal housing protections.
Before the ruling
After a broad ruling
Any federal basis for re-extending these protections is eliminated.
Before the ruling
Federal public accommodations law (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) does not even include sex as a protected category. There is no federal backstop. And the Supreme Court's 2023 ruling in 303 Creative v. Elenis already established that the First Amendment permits refusal of certain services to same-sex couples.
After a broad ruling
Confirmation that no federal law protects transgender people in public accommodations at all.
The legislative wave did not wait for the Court, and the tracker totals show how high it has already climbed.
| Year | Bills Introduced | Bills Passed |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 153 | 18 |
| 2022 | 174 | 26 |
| 2023 | 615 | 87 |
| 2024 | 701 | 51 |
| 2025 | 1,022 | 126 |
| 2026 | 793 (so far) | 55 (so far) |
Source: Trans Legislation Tracker.
In 2026 alone, bills are being tracked across 43 states plus 127 federal bills in Congress. The most active states are Oklahoma (59 bills), Missouri (53), and South Carolina (45).
Historical pass rates have run between 7% and 15% of introduced bills. The post-Skrmetti years have run 12–15%, which would put 2026 at roughly 95–120 anti-trans laws for the year. The floor is already set: 55 have passed, with most legislatures adjourned and special sessions still possible. The cumulative total since 2021 already stands at roughly 363.
A ruling that reaches that far is a civil rights rollback, whatever the headline calls it.
Twenty-seven states have enacted bans on gender-affirming care for minors. Arizona's covers surgery only, and after state constitutional blocks in Montana and Kansas, roughly 25 are enforceable today. The new frontier is adults:
Forty-five bills tracked in 2026 requiring use of facilities matching sex assigned at birth. If B.P.J. extends the Skrmetti framework to facility access, these bills would face only rational basis review in federal court, the standard laws almost never fail. Until then, Grimm still stands in their way in the 4th Circuit, and state constitutional challenges remain live everywhere. And as the next section explains, West Virginia already has a bathroom ban with a tripwire provision waiting for Grimm to fall.
Twenty-one bills targeting birth certificates in 2026. North Dakota has already enacted multiple laws (HB 1139, HB 1297) restricting gender marker updates on birth certificates and IDs. A mismatched or voided document comes up at the traffic stop, on the I-9 form at a new job, and at the pharmacy counter.
Twenty-three bills in 2026. Montana's drag ban (HB 359, signed 2023) is the model: it bars drag performances in publicly funded spaces where minors are present. It's broadly written enough to cover any gender-nonconforming performance. Currently partially blocked by a federal court injunction upheld by the 9th Circuit in March 2026.
Montana (HB 676, enacted 2023) and Kentucky (SB 150, enacted 2023) include provisions requiring or permitting school staff to inform parents if a student identifies as LGBTQ or requests accommodations. Kansas AG Kris Kobach has pushed forced outing policies via legal opinions and letters to school districts. Montana and Kentucky have also enacted "Don't Say Gay" provisions limiting instruction on gender identity and sexual orientation.
Kansas, North Dakota, Montana, and Kentucky allow teachers to refuse to use students' chosen pronouns without professional consequence.
127 federal bills tracked in the 119th Congress. Key measures:
As of June 2026, 15 states and Washington, D.C. have enacted shield laws protecting gender-affirming care:
Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii, Colorado, New Mexico, Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, and D.C.
Shield states per this report's sources as of June 2026. Care-ban states per the Williams Institute, January 2026. Arizona's ban covers surgery only and Georgia's does not cover puberty blockers. The Montana and Kansas bans are blocked under their state constitutions.
Shield laws protect providers from out-of-state subpoenas, investigations, prosecution, and professional discipline. They prohibit state agencies from cooperating with federal or out-of-state investigations. They bar extradition for providing care that is legal in the shield state.
Hawaii became the 15th shield state on May 29, 2026, weeks before the ruling. Oregon strengthened its protections in 2026 (HB 4088) and Massachusetts enacted "Shield Law 2.0" in August 2025.
Shield states are the backstop for care: if federal protections collapse, that is where access to gender-affirming care keeps its strongest legal footing. More than 20 states also carry explicit gender-identity nondiscrimination statutes that no federal definition can rewrite. The map is still a patchwork, and your rights still depend on your zip code.
This is what happens the moment the ruling drops. Several state laws are structured so that a favorable SCOTUS decision automatically activates restrictions that are currently unenforceable.
West Virginia's "Riley Gaines Act" (SB 456), signed in 2025, defines "male" and "female" by biological sex and bars transgender people from using single-sex facilities (locker rooms, restrooms, domestic violence shelters) consistent with their gender identity in state-owned buildings.
But it has an explicit trigger provision: the law cannot be enforced as long as the 4th Circuit's ruling in Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board (2020) remains good law. The statute reads:
"This article shall not be enforced in any manner inconsistent with or in violation of the ruling in Grimm v. Gloucester School Board… If a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States… overrule or otherwise render the Grimm decision ineffective, then the limitations on enforcement imposed by this subsection shall be considered repealed."
If B.P.J. renders Grimm ineffective, which a broad ruling would, West Virginia's bathroom ban is designed to activate immediately. The state will argue the trigger was pulled the day the opinion lands. Whether a narrower sports-only ruling pulls it too will be litigated, because Grimm rests on both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The statute's own text also names a second trigger: a 4th Circuit decision undoing Grimm counts as well. The tripwire is already wired into the statute; the only thing missing is the ruling.
Six state sports bans have been partially or fully enjoined. A SCOTUS ruling upholding Idaho's and West Virginia's bans would clear the way for courts to dissolve the injunctions that still bite:
Of the 27 states that enacted bans on gender-affirming care for minors:
After the ruling, SCOTUS vacated and remanded several appellate decisions "for further consideration in light of Skrmetti":
The lower courts must now reconsider these rulings under the rational-basis standard Skrmetti established. The first already came out differently: on remand, the 4th Circuit reversed itself on West Virginia's Medicaid exclusion.
West Virginia SB 456, the "Riley Gaines Act," signed 2025. Section 5-32-1(c) contains an explicit trigger provision: "This article shall not be enforced in any manner inconsistent with or in violation of the ruling in Grimm v. Gloucester School Board… If a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States… overrule or otherwise render the Grimm decision ineffective, then the limitations on enforcement imposed by this subsection shall be considered repealed." ↩
Court injunction status as of June 2026. Idaho (HB 500, preliminary injunction upheld by 9th Circuit); West Virginia (HB 3293, 4th Circuit injunction as to B.P.J.); Arizona (ARS 15-120.02, preliminary injunction, D. Ariz.); Utah (court order blocking enforcement); New Hampshire (HB 1205, temporarily blocked as to two named plaintiffs); Montana (2021 ban partially blocked as to higher education, superseded by 2025 ban). ↩
793 anti-trans bills introduced in 2026 as of June, across 43 states. Source: Trans Legislation Tracker (translegislation.com). ↩
EEOC federal sector appellate decision, Selina S. v. Driscoll, EEOC Appeal No. 2025003976 (Feb. 26, 2026): "Title VII permits a federal agency employer to exclude employees, including trans-identifying employees, from opposite-sex facilities." The decision binds federal-sector agencies. Texas v. EEOC, No. 2:24-cv-00173 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025) vacated the EEOC's harassment guidance extending Bostock to bathroom, pronoun, and dress accommodation claims. ↩
Oklahoma SB 904, signed May 12, 2026, prohibits all public funds for gender transition care at any age. Kentucky HB 553 (2026) would expand the state's Medicaid exclusion to adults. Oklahoma SB 1793 (Sen. Shane Jett) would extend public-funding restrictions further but remains in committee. Currently, 11 states exclude Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming care for all ages. ↩
H.R. 28 (Protection of Women and Girls in Sports Act) passed the House 218–206 in January 2025; Senate companion S. 9 failed cloture. H.R. 8781 (Title IX Clarification Act) introduced May 2026 with 31 cosponsors, 33 as of June 11, 2026. ↩
Crowther v. Board of Regents, No. 25-183, certiorari granted May 18, 2026. The question is whether Title IX provides employees of federally funded schools a private right of action for sex discrimination. If the Court narrows Title IX's scope while deciding Crowther, the statute loses its power as an enforcement tool. ↩
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020). Gavin Grimm was represented by the ACLU. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. South Carolina has since argued to SCOTUS that Grimm is a "discredited outlier" that is "irreconcilable with Skrmetti." The Court declined to intervene but expressly noted it was not weighing in on the merits. ↩
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017). Reaffirmed and extended in A.C. v. Metropolitan School District of Martinsville, 75 F.4th 760 (7th Cir. 2023). ↩
Hecox v. Little, 104 F.4th 1061 (9th Cir. 2024). The 9th Circuit found Idaho's HB 500 "certainly classifies on the basis of sex" and "also classifies based on transgender status, triggering heightened scrutiny on both grounds." The court found the ban was overbroad because it excluded transgender women regardless of their physiology, medical treatment, or the nature of the sport. ↩
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination "because of … sex" (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs (20 U.S.C. § 1681). The Fair Housing Act prohibits housing discrimination "because of sex" (42 U.S.C. § 3604). Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act prohibits sex discrimination in healthcare (42 U.S.C. § 18116). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." All of these use the word "sex" without defining it. Whether that word includes gender identity is the dispositive question across all of them. ↩
West Virginia v. B.P.J., No. 24-43 (U.S.); Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38 (U.S.). Both cases were argued on January 13, 2026, in a combined session. See SCOTUSblog: scotusblog.com/cases/west-virginia-v-b-p-j-2-2/ and scotusblog.com/cases/little-v-hecox/. ↩
United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025). Decided June 18, 2025, in a 6–3 ruling. The Court upheld Tennessee's SB1, which bans gender-affirming medical treatments for minors, ruling that the law classifies by "age and medical use" rather than sex, and therefore is subject only to rational basis review, the most deferential standard of judicial review, under which a law need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest to survive. ↩
Chiles v. Salazar, No. 24-539 (U.S.), decided March 31, 2026. The Court held 8–1 that Colorado's ban on conversion therapy for minors regulated speech based on viewpoint and therefore required strict First Amendment scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the majority; only Justice Jackson dissented. ↩
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020). Decided June 15, 2020, in a 6–3 ruling written by Justice Gorsuch. The Court held that Title VII's prohibition on discrimination "because of … sex" encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The reasoning: it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being transgender without taking their sex into account. Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. ↩
West Virginia v. B.P.J., No. 24-43. The case comes from the 4th Circuit, which ruled for B.P.J. on her Title IX claim and remanded the equal protection claim. The district court had ruled for West Virginia on both claims. Questions presented: (1) whether Title IX prevents a state from designating sports teams based on biological sex at birth; (2) whether the Equal Protection Clause does so. ↩
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681): "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The Javits Amendment (Pub. L. 93-380, 1974) added a provision allowing "reasonable provisions considering the type of sports involved," the textual hook states use to argue sex-separated sports are permitted. ↩
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified 1868): "No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Courts apply different levels of scrutiny depending on the type of classification: strict scrutiny for race, alienage, and national origin (the government must show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring); intermediate scrutiny for sex (the government must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" and that the law is substantially related to an important objective, per Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)); and rational basis for everything else (the government need only show a conceivable rational basis). ↩
Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38. The case comes from the 9th Circuit, which found Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act (HB 500, enacted 2020) likely violates the Equal Protection Clause. The 9th Circuit held that the ban "certainly classifies on the basis of sex" and "also classifies based on transgender status, triggering heightened scrutiny on both grounds." Hecox v. Little, 104 F.4th 1061 (9th Cir. 2024). There is a potential mootness issue: Hecox has stated she no longer intends to compete, which could allow the Court to dismiss the case without reaching the merits. ↩
Idaho HB 500 (2020), the "Fairness in Women's Sports Act," categorically prohibits transgender women and girls from competing on women's or girls' sports teams at any Idaho public school or university. It was the first such law in the nation and served as a model for similar legislation in other states. ↩
The Court heard oral arguments in both cases on January 13, 2026, in a combined session lasting approximately three and a half hours. Counsel for Idaho: Alan M. Hurst, Solicitor General. Counsel for West Virginia: Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General. Counsel for the United States as amicus supporting the states: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General. Counsel for B.P.J.: Joshua A. Block (ACLU). Counsel for Hecox: Kathleen R. Hartnett. ↩
Chief Justice Roberts, during oral argument in B.P.J. and Hecox, January 13, 2026. His "across the board" comment signals he is thinking about the implications for bathroom access, housing, and other sex-separated contexts, not just sports. ↩
Justice Kavanaugh, during oral argument. His comment reflects a judicial restraint argument: the Court should let the democratic process resolve the question rather than constitutionalizing a rule. This framing could lead to a narrow opinion that avoids the Equal Protection Clause question entirely. ↩
Justice Barrett, during oral argument (Tr. of Oral Arg., No. 24-38, Jan. 13, 2026: "So it's really an intermediate scrutiny problem. Maybe it's a rational basis problem too."). Intermediate scrutiny is the standard applied to sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause (Craig v. Boren). Barrett's question suggests she is thinking about whether a transgender person challenging a sex-based classification presents a novel legal question that the Court has avoided because sex already receives intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. ↩
Justice Gorsuch, during oral argument. A "discrete and insular minority" is the test from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which suggested that "discrete and insular minorities" who face prejudice and political powerlessness deserve heightened judicial protection. Gorsuch's question is notable because he wrote Bostock and may be exploring whether its reasoning extends to the constitutional context. ↩
Justice Sotomayor questioned mootness in Hecox. If Hecox no longer intends to compete, the Court may lack jurisdiction because there is no live case or controversy, a constitutional requirement under Article III. ↩
Justice Kagan focused on as-applied challenges: whether individual transgender athletes might be able to compete under narrower, sport-specific rules (e.g., testosterone-level requirements) rather than categorical bans. This approach would avoid deciding the broad constitutional question. ↩
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020). The Court consolidated three cases involving employees fired for being gay or transgender. In each case, the employer admitted the employee was fired because of their sexual orientation or transgender status. The Court held that discrimination "because of … sex" necessarily encompasses these situations, because the employer would not have fired the employee if their sex were different. ↩
Texas v. EEOC, No. 2:24-cv-00173 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025). Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk held that Bostock "decided only whether firing an employee for being transgender constituted Title VII 'sex' discrimination under its but-for causation test." He vacated portions of the EEOC's 2024 harassment guidance that extended Bostock to workplace policies on bathrooms, pronouns, and dress codes, writing that "Title VII does not bar workplace employment policies that protect the inherent differences between men and women." ↩
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII. It is headed by a chair appointed by the President. Under the Biden administration, the EEOC interpreted Bostock broadly to cover workplace harassment and accommodation claims involving gender identity. Under Chair Andrea Lucas (appointed by President Trump), the EEOC has reversed course and is interpreting Bostock narrowly. ↩
EEOC federal sector appellate decision, Selina S. v. Driscoll, EEOC Appeal No. 2025003976 (Feb. 26, 2026), holding that "Title VII permits a federal agency employer to exclude employees, including trans-identifying employees, from opposite-sex facilities." The decision binds federal-sector agencies. ↩
Under Chair Andrea Lucas, the EEOC moved in early 2025 to dismiss multiple discrimination lawsuits it had filed on behalf of transgender workers against private employers, and reversed the Biden-era interpretation of Bostock. ↩
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681). Originally enacted to address sex discrimination in education (particularly to ensure equal athletic opportunities for women), it has been interpreted broadly to cover sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, and (under Biden) gender identity discrimination. The scope of "on the basis of sex" is the central question in B.P.J. ↩
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020). Gavin Grimm, a transgender boy, was barred from using the boys' restroom at his high school. The 4th Circuit held that both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause protect transgender students' right to use facilities matching their gender identity. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. South Carolina has since argued to SCOTUS that Grimm is a "discredited outlier" that is "irreconcilable with Skrmetti." The Court declined to intervene but expressly noted it was not weighing in on the merits. ↩
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); A.C. v. Metropolitan School District of Martinsville, 75 F.4th 760 (7th Cir. 2023). Both cases held that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause protect transgender students from exclusion. ↩
The Biden administration's 2024 Title IX Final Rule (89 Fed. Reg. 33474, April 29, 2024) interpreted Title IX's "on the basis of sex" to include gender identity. It was challenged by multiple states. On January 9, 2025, before Trump took office, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky vacated the entire rule nationwide in State of Tennessee v. Cardona. The Trump administration declined to appeal. The 2020 Title IX Rule (from Trump's first term) is back in effect. It does not include gender identity. One appeal remains pending in the 11th Circuit (Alabama v. Cardona, No. 24-12444) but is unlikely to revive the rule given the current administration's opposition. However: the statutory question (whether Title IX's text itself protects transgender students) is separate from the regulation, and is exactly what B.P.J. will decide. ↩
Crowther v. Board of Regents, No. 25-183 (U.S.), certiorari granted May 18, 2026. The question is whether Title IX provides employees of federally funded schools a private right of action for sex discrimination claims. The 11th Circuit held it does not (splitting from other circuits). The case will be argued in the October 2026 term. If the Court simultaneously narrows Title IX's scope while deciding Crowther, it could limit Title IX as an enforcement mechanism for sex discrimination in education entirely. ↩
The Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3604) prohibits discrimination in housing "because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." The Biden HUD issued guidance interpreting "sex" to include gender identity. The Trump administration reversed this interpretation. ↩
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. § 18116) prohibits discrimination "on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability" in health programs receiving federal financial assistance. The Biden administration's implementing rule extended this to cover gender identity and sexual orientation. Multiple federal courts enjoined the rule. The Trump administration reversed it. ↩
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a) prohibits discrimination in public accommodations based on race, color, religion, or national origin. Notably, it does not include sex as a protected category. There is no federal public accommodations law covering sex or gender identity discrimination. ↩
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023). The Court held 6–3 that the First Amendment prohibits Colorado from requiring a website designer to create websites for same-sex weddings. The decision established that the First Amendment permits refusal of certain expressive services based on the content of the message, even when the refusal would otherwise violate anti-discrimination law. ↩
Trans Legislation Tracker (translegislation.com) maintains a real-time database of anti-transgender legislation in the United States. The figures cited are cumulative through June 2026. ↩
Bill categories in 2026: Education (197 bills), Healthcare (193), Sports (100), Bathroom (45), Drag/Performance (23), Birth Certificates (21), Marriage (17), Employment (15), Incarceration (14), Child Abuse (12), Civil Rights (12). Categories overlap and not every bill is categorized, so category counts do not sum to the 793 total. ↩
Historical pass rates: 2021 (12%), 2022 (15%), 2023 (14%), 2024 (7%), 2025 (12%). The 2024 dip likely reflects election-year caution. The 2025–2026 rebound reflects the Skrmetti signal. ↩
As of 2025, 27 states have enacted bans on gender-affirming care for minors. The number varies between 25 and 27 depending on the source and how partial bans (e.g., Arizona's surgical-only ban) are counted. Montana's ban is the only one permanently blocked, on state constitutional grounds; Kansas's ban is temporarily blocked on state constitutional grounds as well. Skrmetti removed the primary federal constitutional obstacle (the argument that such bans violate the Equal Protection Clause) for all remaining states. ↩
Oklahoma SB 904, approved by Governor Kevin Stitt on May 12, 2026. The law prohibits all public funds for gender transition procedures at any age, bars state facilities from providing care, and restricts providers who receive any state funding. Care from private providers remains legal. ↩
Oklahoma SB 1793, introduced by State Senator Shane Jett. The bill prohibits public funding for gender transition at any age. Senator Jett has publicly stated broader ambitions, but the bill as drafted targets public funding rather than imposing a complete ban on private care. It remains in committee as of June 2026. ↩
Kentucky HB 553 (2026) would expand the state's 2025 Medicaid exclusion to nearly all publicly funded coverage. Tennessee's TennCare has excluded transgender-related care for all ages since 2006, and Mississippi barred public funds for this care in 2023. West Virginia's all-ages exclusion was restored by the 4th Circuit in March 2026, reversing Fain v. Crouch. Currently, 11 states explicitly exclude Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming care for all ages. ↩
Executive Order 14168 ("Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism," January 20, 2025) declares that federal policy defines "sex" as biological sex at birth. Subsequent agency actions: the VA ended transgender care for new patients; HHS issued a rule prohibiting gender-affirming care as an essential health benefit under the ACA; federal employee insurance coverage for transition treatment is being excluded from 2026 plans; and the administration has moved to bar hospitals receiving federal funds from providing transition services to anyone under 19, a restriction courts have preliminarily enjoined and multiple states are challenging, so its enforcement remains contested. ↩
Examples include North Dakota HB 1522 (enacted 2023), which prohibits transgender K-12 students from using bathrooms not matching biological sex, and Kentucky SB 150 (enacted 2023), which includes bathroom restrictions based on biological sex. ↩
North Dakota HB 1139 (signed April 2023) amends birth record requirements. HB 1297 (signed May 2023) restricts correction or amendment of birth records. HCR 3010 (filed April 2023) is a concurrent resolution urging biological sex distinctions on identification documents. ↩
Montana HB 359, signed May 22, 2023 (Chapter 719). Prohibits minors from attending drag shows and bars drag performances in publicly funded schools, libraries, and public spaces where minors are present. The 9th Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction against the law in March 2026. The broadly worded statute can extend to any gender-nonconforming performance, potentially including theatrical productions or any situation where a person appears in clothing not associated with their sex assigned at birth. ↩
Montana HB 676 (enacted 2023), titled "Revise laws to clarify fundamental parental rights," prohibits school employees from encouraging students to withhold health-related information from parents. Kentucky SB 150 (enacted 2023, veto overridden) establishes parental notification rights regarding student gender identity and limits instruction on gender identity and sexual orientation. ↩
Montana's "Don't Say Gay" provisions include SB 99 (2021) and HB 471 (2025), which restrict discussion of gender identity in schools. Kentucky SB 150 (enacted 2023) limits instruction on gender identity and sexual orientation. ↩
Kansas, North Dakota, Montana, and Kentucky have enacted or advanced legislation allowing teachers and school staff to refuse to use students' chosen pronouns without professional consequence. ↩
Indiana SB 182 (2026 session) passed the Senate 37–8 on January 27, 2026, then died in the House Public Health Committee without a hearing when the session adjourned in March 2026. An earlier version, SB 0441 (2024 session), had identical content and also did not pass. The bill defines "sex" and "gender" as synonymous biological terms determined at birth, explicitly erasing any legal concept of gender identity. ↩
Maryland HB 1399 (2025 session). The bill proposed penalties of up to life imprisonment for healthcare providers who provide gender-affirming care to minors. It died in committee after a hearing on March 11, 2025, in Maryland's Democrat-dominated legislature. ↩
Congress.gov and GovTrack. The 119th Congress (2025–2026) has seen 127 bills related to transgender issues, an increase from the 118th Congress. ↩
H.R. 28, Protection of Women and Girls in Sports Act of 2025 (Rep. Greg Steube, R-FL-17). Passed the House on January 14, 2025, by a vote of 218–206. The bill defines "sex" as "reproductive biology and genetics at birth" for purposes of Title IX. The Senate companion, S. 9, failed to achieve cloture (the 60-vote threshold needed to proceed to a vote) on March 3, 2025, by a vote of 51–45. ↩
H.R. 1028, Protection of Women in Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 2026 (Rep. Steube). Amends the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act to require the US Olympic and Paralympic Committee to define "male" and "female" based on biology and prohibit transgender women from competing in women's events. Reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee, 15–10, on February 3, 2026. ↩
H.R. 8781, Title IX Clarification Act of 2026 (Rep. Jodey Arrington, R-TX). Introduced May 13, 2026. Would amend Title IX to specify that "on the basis of sex" means "biological reality of sex." 31 cosponsors at introduction, 33 as of June 11, 2026. In committee. ↩
The 15 states with enacted shield laws are: Washington, Oregon, California, Hawaii, Colorado, New Mexico, Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maryland. Hawaii is the newest, by HB 1875, signed May 29, 2026. Washington, D.C. has enacted equivalent protections. Arizona, New Jersey, and Delaware have executive order protections. ↩
Shield laws vary by state but generally include: (1) protection of providers from out-of-state subpoenas, investigations, and prosecution; (2) prohibition on state agencies cooperating with out-of-state investigations; (3) refusal to honor extradition requests for conduct that is legal in the shield state; (4) protection of patient medical records; and (5) some cover telehealth provision across state lines. ↩
Oregon HB 4088 (2026), signed as Chapter 52, 2026 Laws, effective March 31, 2026. Enhanced shield protections including: prohibiting the governor from extraditing providers; making court petitions for legal sex change confidential; adding privacy protections for provider identities. ↩
Massachusetts "Shield Law 2.0" (Chapter 16, Acts of 2025), signed August 7, 2025. Expanded protected provider categories to include allied health, community health workers, podiatrists, respiratory therapists, and others. Prohibited state and local authorities from cooperating with federal investigations into legal care. ↩
West Virginia SB 456, the "Riley Gaines Act," signed into law in 2025. Section 5-32-1(c) contains the trigger provision tied to Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board. The law defines "male" and "female" by biological sex and restricts access to single-sex facilities in state-owned buildings. ↩
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020). The 4th Circuit held that a transgender boy must be allowed to use the boys' restroom at his high school, under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. South Carolina has argued to SCOTUS that Grimm is a "discredited outlier" that is "irreconcilable with Skrmetti." The Court declined to intervene but expressly noted it was not weighing in on the merits. ↩
Court injunction status compiled from SCOTUSblog, ACLU case dockets, and federal court records as of June 2026. The scope of each injunction varies: some block enforcement only as to named plaintiffs, others are broader. ↩
Healthcare ban enforcement status compiled from KFF, MAP, ACLU legislative tracker, and federal/state court records as of June 2026. ↩
Folwell v. Kadel (4th Cir., en banc Nos. 22-1721/22-1725); Hamso v. M.H. (9th Cir.); Crouch v. Anderson (4th Cir.); and Fowler v. Stitt (10th Cir.). All vacated and remanded by SCOTUS on June 30, 2025, for further consideration in light of Skrmetti. On remand, the 4th Circuit reversed its earlier ruling in the West Virginia Medicaid case (Anderson v. Crouch). ↩
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020). The textualist reasoning: "An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids." (Gorsuch, J., at 6.) ↩
United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025). Roberts, C.J., writing for the majority: "We have not yet considered whether Bostock's reasoning reaches beyond the Title VII context, and we need not do so here." ↩
Rational basis review is the most deferential standard of judicial review. Under rational basis, a law is constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Courts virtually never strike down laws under rational basis. By contrast, intermediate scrutiny (applied to sex-based classifications) requires the government to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" and that the law is substantially related to an important objective. Strict scrutiny (applied to race) requires a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. ↩
The Court in Skrmetti explicitly reserved the question of whether Bostock's reasoning extends to the Equal Protection Clause or to other federal statutes. However, the majority's reasoning (that Tennessee's law classifies by "age and medical use" rather than sex) effectively rejects Bostock's but-for causation framework for equal protection purposes. ↩
Justice Thomas, concurring, argued that transgender status is not a quasi-suspect class because it is not defined by immutable characteristics. Justice Barrett, concurring (joined by Thomas), argued that the set of suspect classifications is "virtually closed" and that "we have never embraced a new suspect class under this test." Justice Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, also arguing against heightened scrutiny. ↩
Justice Barrett's concurrence in Skrmetti, joined by Justice Thomas. She applied the factors from Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986): whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics; whether it has historically been subjected to discrimination; and whether it is a minority or politically powerless. Barrett found transgender people lack the defining-characteristics factor, and on the history of de jure discrimination expressly took no position, while writing that the record before the Court was "sparse but suggestive of relatively little de jure discrimination" and that she would require such a history going forward. ↩
Chiles v. Salazar, No. 24-539 (U.S.), decided March 31, 2026. Kaley Chiles, a licensed therapist, challenged Colorado's Minor Conversion Therapy Law, which prohibited licensed mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors. The 10th Circuit upheld the law. The Supreme Court reversed, 8–1. ↩
The Court held that the Colorado law regulated speech based on viewpoint because it allowed counselors to help minors explore and affirm LGBTQ+ identity but prohibited efforts to change it. Justice Kagan, concurring, called it a "textbook" example of viewpoint discrimination. Strict scrutiny (the most demanding standard of judicial review, under which the government must show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring) applies on remand. ↩
Movement Advancement Project nondiscrimination tracker, as of June 2026: 23 states plus D.C. prohibit discrimination based on gender identity by explicit statute in employment, with most covering housing and public accommodations as well. ↩
27 states ban transgender students from school sports consistent with their gender identity by statute; two more do so by regulation or policy. Movement Advancement Project and Williams Institute, as of June 2026. ↩
This report was compiled from primary sources including Supreme Court opinions and oral argument transcripts, SCOTUSblog case pages, the Trans Legislation Tracker, the ACLU Legislative Tracker, Movement Advancement Project, Freedom for All Americans, Congress.gov, amicus briefs from the ACLU, Lambda Legal, GLAD, NCLR, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the Transgender Law Center, and reporting from multiple news outlets.
